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Abstract 
 
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism. It can be characterized as 
the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a subject, a proposition known and 
a contrast proposition. According to contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form 
“S knows that p, rather than q”. In this paper I raise several problems for contrastivism: it 
lacks plausibility for many cases of knowledge, is too relaxed concerning the third 
relatum, and overlooks a further relativity of the knowledge relation. 
 
 
 
One of the most recent trends in epistemology is contrastivism (see Sinnott-Armstrong 
2004, Schaffer 2005a, Karjalainen / Morton 2003, Johnson 2001 and Blaauw 2004; an 
early precursor can be found in Dretske 1972; see also a short passage in Swinburne 2001, 
34). It can be characterized as the thesis that knowledge is a ternary relation between a 
subject, a proposition known and a contrast proposition (which is incompatible with the 
known proposition, and which can consist of a conjunction of propositions).1 According to 
1 Contrastivism about knowledge can easily be combined with an analoguous contrastivism about 
justification. 
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contrastivism, knowledge attributions have the form “S knows that p, rather than q” (where 
“rather than q” is, of course, not part of what is claimed to be known here). Here is an 
example. Jack is eating cheddar cheese which he can distinguish from marmalade but not 
from gruyère cheese. Hence, he might know that he is eating cheddar cheese rather than 
marmalade but he does not know and is not in a position to know that he is eating cheddar 
rather than gruyère. Like contextualism, contrastivism has interesting things to say about 
epistemic scepticism. Jack might not be able to rule out that he is being deceived by a 
Cartesian demon into thinking that he is eating cheddar; hence, he cannot know that he is 
eating cheddar rather than just suffering from Cartesian cheddar illusions. However, he can 
still know that he is eating cheddar rather than marmalade. Contrastivism is close not just 
to epistemic contextualism (see, e.g., DeRose 1999) but also to relevant alternatives 
theories of knowledge (or justification) (see, e.g., Dretske 1970). In contrast, however, to 
relevant alternatives accounts, contrastivism assumes that knowledge is ternary. And in 
contrast to contextualism, contrastivism is not wedded to (but could be combined with) the 
idea that the truth conditions of knowledge attributions can vary with the attributor´s 
contexts. Contrastivism as explained above is neutral with respect to contextualism: It 
implies neither contextualist theses nor their negations. One could call any non-
contextualist version of contrastivism "pure contrastivism" (see, e.g., for this view Sinnott-
Armstrong 2004) and any contextualist version of it "hybrid (contextualist) contrastivism". 
Some of the problems raised below might find a solution if contrastivism is combinded 
with contextualism. - In the following I will raise several critical concerns for 
contrastivism (and include an appendix on contrastivism about beliefs). They point at 
 3 
limitations and necessary modifications of contrastivism and are arranged in the order of 
increasing weight.  
 
1. Non-contrastive Knowledge 
 
There are many cases which seem to strongly support a contrastivist account of knowledge 
(see, e.g., Schaffer 2005a). Perhaps the best case for contrastivism is perceptual knowledge 
based on discriminatory abilities. Jack can distinguish between dogs and cats but not 
between dogs and wolves. He sees a dog in front of him (under normal conditions) and 
thus comes to know that there is a dog in front of him. According to the contrastivist, “Jack 
knows that there is a dog in front of him” is elliptical for something like “Jack knows that 
there is a dog in front of him rather than a cat.” One of the greatest advantages of 
contrastivism is that it can account for the lack of knowledge in cases like Jack’s inability 
to tell dogs from wolves: “Jack does not know that there is a dog in front of him rather than 
a wolf” is also true, according to the contrastivist. A binary view of knowledge has 
problems accounting for our opposing tendencies to attribute and deny knowledge that 
there is a dog to Jack; contrastivism easily resolves the puzzle. The application to the 
problem of epistemological scepticism is also tempting: Jack can know that it is a dog 
rather than a cat but he may not know that it is a dog rather than a dog-hallucination 
brought about by Descartes’ evil demon. Contrastivism can, like contextualism, account 
for both our sceptical and our anti-sceptical views and tendencies.  
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Crucial to all this is the idea that a subject might know that p with respect to some 
but not all potential contrast propositions. To be sure, the contrastivist does not need to 
deny the possibility of cases where a subject knows some proposition with respect to all 
possible contrast propositions. But this would be an extreme case. Contrastivism has its 
real point when analyzing normal cases where a subject knows that p rather than q but does 
not know that p rather than r (see above). If that were not the case, contrastivism would 
lose its point and attractiveness (see, e.g., Schaffer 2005a, sec.2; 2005b). This leads to the 
following plausibility constraint for any contrastivist analysis of knowledge of some type 
(perception, memory, etc.): 
 
(Specificity) A contrastivist analysis of knowledge of some type is plausible only if there 
are for a given subject S a lot of triples of propositions p, q and r such that S knows that p 
rather than q but S does not know p rather than r (where “knows” refers to knowledge of 
that type).  
 
This condition is vague in so far as it does not indicate a minimal number of such triples of 
propositions for some person and type of knowledge. However, we do not need to be more 
specific here. It is already clear only some but not all types of knowledge meet the 
Specificity-condition: perception for instance. However, other types of knowledge don’t 
meet it. 
Take knowledge of obvious mathematical truths, like the simple one that 2+2=4. 
Does anyone who knows that know it in contrast to something else? In contrast to what, 
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then? To 2+2=5 (Or 2+2=-.7? Or 3+3=4? Or 12x12=1212?)? There simply does not 
seem to be a plausible contrast proposition around. The problem is that (Specificity) does 
not seem to hold for this kind of knowledge. It is hard to imagine, for instance, how there 
could be two numbers x and y (not equal to 4) such that S knows that 2+2=4 rather than 
2+2=x but that S does not know that 2+2=4 rather than 2+2=y. It would be very interesting 
to find someone who, e.g., knows that 2+2=4 rather than 2+2=40 but who does not know 
that 2+2=4 rather than 2+2=5 (“too close!”). It would be very hard to make sense of such a 
subject or even to attribute knowledge to her in the first place. It seems that whoever 
knows that 2+2=4 knows this rather than 2+2=z, for any z not equal to 4.2 
The contrastivist might reply here that this is still compatible with his view: S knows 
that p rather than not-p (or rather than any alternative). This, however, is perhaps 
compatible with the letter but certainly not with the spirit of contrastivism. The prize for 
this kind of manoeuvre is the rejection of (Specificity) and trivialization. Nobody would 
deny that one can talk like that but this way of talking would be like an additional wheel 
spinning in the void. We might as well go back to the binary view of knowledge. 
The point above is not restricted to mathematical knowledge. Similar things can be 
said about basic forms of logical knowledge. To be sure, there are very difficult questions 
in mathematics or logic with respect to which it might make sense to say that someone 
knew at a time that this formula is valid rather than that one. However, this manœuvre 
2 To be sure, few, if any, subjects are able to grasp all possible contrast propositions to a given, known 
proposition. For instance, someone might understand that 2+2=5 but not understand that 2+2=1/4, due 
to a lack of understanding of fractions (thanks to a referee here). However, that there is such a 
difference between "accessible" (for the subject) contrast propositions and non-accessible contrast 
propositions does not at all support the claim that knowledge is contrastive in the first place or that 
contrast propositions or a subset of them play the role the contrastivist thinks they play. Similar things 
hold in the case of contrast proposition which either lack a truth value or are false for non-
mathematical reasons, like, e.g., "2+2=Julius Caesar".  
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won´t work for basic and simple cases like knowledge that if p then p, or that everything is 
identical with itself (what would be the contrast here?). I will not repeat the argument from 
specificity here but rather shortly mention another case, namely linguistic or conceptual 
knowledge. What would be a plausible contrast proposition for knowledge that vixen are 
female foxes? One can suspect that at least some of the classical candidates for aprioricity 
create this kind of trouble for contrastivism because they don’t meet (Specificity). 
All this suggests that not all knowledge is contrastive. More cautiously: Nobody so 
far has shown (and it does not seem likely) that all types of knowledge admit of 
contrastivist analyses. To put it more positively: It seems that contrastivism is most 
plausible and probably only plausible with respect to a particular kind of knowledge: 
knowledge of propositions which involves the use of discriminatory cognitive abilities. 
The use of such abilities need not be restricted to one´s external environment: 
Discrimination is also needed when it comes, for instance, to the identification of a 
particular emotion as sympathy rather than pity. So, why not explicitly restrict 
contrastivism to cases of discriminatory knowledge? 
One might, however, want to propose more radical consequences.3 Starting with the 
assumption that  
 
(A) If some kinds of knowledge are contrastive, then all kinds of knowledge are 
contrastive 
 
3 Thanks to a referee here. 
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one could argue that since some kinds of knowledge (e.g., knowledge based on 
discriminatory abilities) are contrastive all kinds of knowledge are contrastive. However, 
given the above point about mathematics, things would rather cut the other way around: 
Since not all kinds of knowledge are contrastive, none are. This conclusion would, of 
course, be very bad for the contrastivist. However, since I do not see any good reason to 
accept (A)4, I would rather propose to restrict contrastivist analyses of knowledge in the 
way indicated above (see also the brief remark in Luper 2012, 56).  
 
2. Restricted Relata 
 
The third relatum of contrastivism is a contrast proposition. But why should only contrast 
propositions be able to fill the third argument place?  
Take the following example. Mary is a meteorologist. On her way to work she runs 
into a friend who asks her whether it will be raining later that day. Both can clearly see 
dark rain clouds coming up. Mary replies that she hasn´t been to the weather lab yet but 
that she would certainly expect rain later that day. Let us assume that it does indeed rain 
later that day. In an ordinary context it then seems true to say of Mary that she knows that 
it is going to rain later that day. One hour later, however, a colleague at the weather lab 
asks her whether she already knew whether it was going to rain later that day. Not having 
finished the usual checks required for the daily weather report, she denies that. In a 
4 There are all kinds of differences between the kinds of epistemic states we call “knowledge”: e.g., 
some kinds of “knowledge” preserve information (memory), others involve the acquisition of new 
information (perception). Why shouldn't there be some kinds of the epistemic states we call 
“knowledge” which are contrastive while others aren't?  
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meteorological context it seems false to say of Mary that she knows that it is going to rain 
later that day.  
How should one analyse this in terms of contrast propositions? To be sure, Mary 
might know that it is going to rain rather than snow but not know that it is going to rain 
rather than drizzle. But that is besides the point of our example: What varies in the 
example above is not the contrast proposition but something else: standards relevant in 
particular contexts (meteorological contexts, non-work contexts, etc.; see my forthcoming-
a).5 One can account for all this by proposing that knowledge is a ternary relation between 
a subject, a known proposition and, third, some out of a bunch of entities: contrast 
propositions, context-specific epistemic standards, practical interests (how important is it 
to get it right?), etc. 6 This is, I think, still compatible with the contrastivist spirit even if 
not with its letter as it has been developed so far. It would be compatible with the spirit of 
contrastivism if one were to generalize the account and open the third argument slot up for 
many different kinds of things, or, at least, for more things than just contrast propositions. 
At the same time, contrastivism would lose some of its simplicity and elegance. 
5 To be sure, Mary might know that it is going to rain rather than drizzle only given lab standards but 
she might know that it is going to rain rather than snow also given lay standards. The point above, 
however, is a different one: that she might know that p (it is going to rain), rather than q (it is not 
going to rain) according to some standards (relevant in non-work contexts) but not according to some 
other standards (relevant in lab contexts). Hence, there is more to take into account for the evaluation 
of knowledge attributions than contrast propositions. 
6 The third argument slot would take n-tuples of entities of different kinds (standards, interests, 
contrasts, etc.) as its argument. The number of entities might vary from case to case: sometimes only a 
contrast proposition, sometimes only a standard, sometimes both, etc. An alternative way to go about 
would be to admit n additional argument places (where the value of ”n” can, of course, vary; see 
above). This difference does not matter here. - To indicate what kinds of entities could go into the 
third slot would be a follow-up task for the contrastivist; I cannot go any deeper into that here. Suffice 
it to say that, again (see fn. 4), there is no threat of theoretical disunity if one admits that the third 
argument slot has a disjunctive form. If there were such a threat and if knowledge could therefore not 
be "disjunctive" in the way indicated, then the argument in this section would be even more critical for 
contrastivism because it would suggest that contrastivism has unacceptable implications (that it cannot 
account for the unity of knowledge). 
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3. More Relativization 
 
In the last section I proposed to broaden contrastivism with respect to admissible kinds of 
third relata while in the first section I proposed to restrict it with respect to kinds of 
knowledge. Now, I am going to argue that the contrastivist should accept a further 
condition on the knowledge-relation, a further relativization. Here is what I have in mind. 
Consider Sue who cannot distinguish between a terrier and a dachshund even though 
she clearly sees a difference between a terrier and a cat as well as between a dachshund 
and a cat. She also sees a difference between a dachshund and a labrador or between a 
terrier and a collie; it is just the small dogs which give her epistemic trouble. According to 
the standard contrastivist view, Sue might well know on one occasion that there is a 
dachshund in front of her rather than a cat and she might also know on another occasion 
that there is a terrier in front of her rather than a cat – even though she cannot tell 
dachshunds from terriers and thus cannot know whether there is a dachshund in front of 
her rather than a terrier. This, however, sounds abominable and incorrect. It seems false to 
say that she knows out of the contrast class [dachshund; cat] that there is a dachshund.  
What is wrong with such attributions of knowledge? Here is a first rough idea which 
will have to be developed and modified step by step. Consider Sue, again, who cannot 
(under any circumstances) distinguish between a dachshund and a terrier. To say that Sue 
knows that there is a dachshund rather than a cat seems to imply that she can identify 
dachshunds as such (at least in contrast to, say, terriers) and refer to dachshunds as such. It 
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seems to imply that she also knows that there is a dachshund rather than a terrier. If she 
does not know the latter, then it would rather be correct to say something like “She knows 
that there is a small dog rather than a cat” but not “She knows that there is a dachshund 
rather than a cat.” 
This suggests that there is a further condition concerning the propositions involved in 
the knowledge relation. Suppose S cannot distinguish between Fs and Gs (e.g., dogs and 
wolves). Then there are pairs of propositions p containing F (“F-propositions”; e.g., There 
is a dog) and r containing G (“G-propositions”: e.g., There is a wolf) such that 
 
replacing F by G at one or more places in p gives us r and 
S does not know that p rather than r, and only because S cannot distinguish between Fs and 
Gs.7  
 
Let us call each member of such a pair of propositions a “defeating proposition” of the 
other member of the pair. We can now generalize the point made above in a very 
preliminary way:  
 
(Distinguish-a) If someone knows that p rather than q, then there is no defeating 
proposition r for p. 
 
7 This excludes cases like the following: S does not know that Fa rather than Ga, where “F” stands for 
“x is a dog and Goldbach’s conjecture is true” and “G” for “x is a cat and Goldbach’s conjecture is 
true”.  
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In our case above, Sue cannot distinguish between dachshunds and terriers and thus does 
not know that there is a dachshund in front of her rather than a terrier; thus she does not 
know that there is a dachshund in front of her rather than a cat. There is a defeating 
proposition (that there is a terrier). 
What we can still say about Sue is this: 
 
(1) Sue knows that there is a dachshund or another kind of small dog rather than a cat. 
 
For reasons analogous to the ones above, we also have to introduce a further 
condition concerning the contrast proposition. Suppose Sue cannot distinguish (under any 
circumstances) between cats and mountain lions. We should then say something like this 
about her: 
 
(2) Sue knows that there is a dachshund or another kind of small dog rather than a cat or 
another four-legged furry animal indistinguishable from it. 
 
We thus have to add a complement to (Distinguish-a) relating to the contrast proposition 
instead of the known proposition. Since the contrast proposition is not known, we have to 
add a slightly different kind of condition here. 
Suppose that S cannot distinguish between Hs and Ks (e.g., cats and mountain lions). 
Then there are pairs of contrast propositions q containing H (“H-propositions”; e.g., There 
is a cat) and s containing K (“K-propositions”: e.g., There is a mountain lion) such that 
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replacing H by K at one or more places in q gives us s and 
S cannot tell whether q or s, and only because S cannot distinguish between Hs and Ks. 
 
Let us call each member of such a pair of propositions an “undermining proposition” of the 
other member of the pair. Again, we can say in a very preliminary way: 
 
(Distinguish-b) If someone knows that p rather than q, then there is no undermining 
proposition s for q. 
 
If Sue cannot distinguish between cats and mountain lions and thus cannot tell whether 
there is a cat or a mountain lion in front of her, then she does not know that there is a dog 
in front of her rather than a cat. There is an undermining proposition (that is is a mountain 
lion). 
Putting (Distinguish-a) and (Distinguish-b) together, we get 
 
(Distinguish*) If S knows that p rather than q, then there are no defeating propositions r for 
p and no undermining propositions s for q.8  
 
8 Since this is not a definition of “knowledge”, there is no bad infinite regress looming here. – One 
could also put the point like this: If there is such a proposition r or s, then the correct knowledge 
ascription has the form of “S knows that (p or r) rather than q” or “S knows that p rather than (q or s)” 
or “S knows that (p or r) rather than (q or s)”.  
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There is, however, a huge fly in the ointment: What if r is a sceptical hypothesis?9 
By the very nature of a sceptical hypothesis, we can in principle not distinguish between an 
ordinary scenario (p) and a sceptical one (r). The contrastivist wants to say that we don’t 
know that p rather than r. Given (Distinguish*), we would then have to accept that we 
don’t know that p rather than q – for any ordinary propositions p and q. This is 
unacceptable to the contrastivist. An analogous point can be made about the contrast 
proposition and some sceptical undermining proposition. What then can the contrastivist 
do about this? 
Insofar as (Distinguish*) seems to go into the right direction, we should not give it 
up but rather introduce a further restriction. Not only do we have to think about potentially 
defeating or undermining propositions (r, s) but also about what would admit into the 
group of potentially defeating or undermining propositions. In a sceptical “mood” we let 
sceptical propositions into this group, in a non-sceptical mood we don’t. What belongs into 
the classes (|R, |S) of potentially defeating or undermining propositions can vary from 
situation to situation. Knowledge is relative not just to contrast propositions or classes 
thereof but also to classes of potentially defeating or undermining propositions. This does 
not only concern traditional sceptical propositions but all kinds of propositions the subject 
cannot rule out. Hence, we have to modify (Distinguish*) in the following way: 
 
9 This includes traditional sceptical hypotheses like the evil demon-hypothesis as well as more ordinary 
hypotheses, like the hypothesis that it is not real cheddar one is eating but something that just looks 
and smells like it. 
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(Distinguish) If S knows that p rather than q, then the classes of potentially defeating or 
undermining propositions are restricted in such a way that there are no defeating 
propositions r for p and no undermining propositions s for q. 
 
This condition thus forces the contrastivist to also relativize to |R and |S, not just to 
contrast propositions.10 That this further relativization is quite valuable and important 
becomes clearer if we look at cases. Consider Sue, again, who cannot tell dachshunds from 
terriers but can tell them from labradors and collies. Contrast her with Jack who is unable 
to tell any kind of dog from any other kind. Both can tell dogs from cats. Suppose they are 
both confronted with a terrier. We might, given normal circumstances, be entitled to say 
about both that they know there is a terrier in front of them rather than a cat. However, 
while “Jack knows that there is a terrier rather than a cat” is true only if “It is a labrador” is 
excluded from |R, “Sue knows that there is a terrier rather than a cat” is still true if “It is a 
labrador” is included in |R (but not if, say, “It is a dachshund” is included). And if “It is a 
labrador” is included in |R both in Sue’s and in Jack’s case, then it is true to say of Sue but 
false to say of Jack that they know that there is a terrier in front of them rather than a cat. 
Hence, the further relativization to the classes |R (and |S) in Sue’s and in Jack’s case is 
needed for a full explanation of the truth conditions of the corresponding knowledge 
attributions.11  
10 |R and |S are not included in the set of contrast propositions. Suppose Sue knows that there is a dog 
rather than a cat. There is just one contrast proposition, namely that there is a cat. The propositions 
that there is a dachshund or that there is a mountain lion belong into |R and |S respectively.  
11 Given that |R is not empty, all this also amounts to a holistic condition on knowledge: In order to 
know that p rather than q, S also needs to know that p rather than r (for a number of instantiations of 
“r”). 
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What determines |R and |S? It is tempting to give a contextualist answer here. In that 
case, contrastivism would have to be combined with contextualism. This also goes some 
way towards explaining the initial phenomenon: that it seems false to attribute knowledge 
to Sue that there is a dachshund in front of her rather than a cat. If “There is a terrier” is 
included in |R, then Sue violates (Distinguish) and the corresponding knowledge 
attribution is false. What if only “There is a dachshund” is included in |R? Isn’t it then 
correct to say that she knows that there is a dachshund rather than a cat? Yes but in many if 
not most or all contexts we would not want to restrict |R in this way. In these contexts, 
such a restriction seems inadmissible; the context puts a constraint on admissible 
restrictions of |R (similar things hold of |S, of course). In most normal contexts we would 
not be willing to restrict |R in such a way that, say, “Sue knows there is a dachshund born 
in 2002 and from North-East Switzerland rather than a cat” comes out true. This is not to 
say that there could never be any contexts where we would make this restriction. The 
Swiss association of dachshund owners might test their member’s expertise at their annual 
meeting by asking them to determine age and origin of the dachshunds at the meeting. And 
some members might be able to tell whether a given dachshund was born in 2002 or some 
other year, etc.  
Finally, a worry: Doesn’t (Distinguish) clash with (Specificity) (sec. 1)? Doesn’t the 
latter allow for something the former excludes, namely that S knows that p rather than q 
while not knowing that p rather than r? No. When we say that S knows that p rather than q, 
we are excluding any proposition like r from |R. However, we are not thereby denying that 
there are such propositions (like r) – whose existence is demanded by (Specificity). The 
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appearance of a clash between (Distinguish) and (Specifity) might well be due to not 
explicitly relativizing to the restricted class |R. 
The contrastivist can stick to the ternary analysis of knowledge but will have to add 
the further relativization to classes of defeating and undermining propositions in order to 
keep her view plausible. The prize to pay for this is a remarkable loss of simplicity (and 
elegance).12 Apart from that, the contrastivist will have to explain why some choices of 
such classes seem inadmissible. A contextualist story seems needed here. This would make 
contrastivism “impure”. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
Contrastivism is, I have argued, plausible only for certain types of knowledge (section 1); 
it has a narrower scope than its proponents seem to expect. Furthermore, the third relatum 
of the knowledge relation cannot be restricted to contrast propositions (section 2); 
acknowledging this makes contrastivism lose some of its characteristic profile. Apart from 
that, additional relativization and contextual constraints concerning admissible 
propositions complicate the picture considerably (section 3).13 To be sure, not even in 
12 Perhaps there is also a loss of fit with the empirical data concerning ordinary ways of talking and 
thinking about knowledge. However, the two additional relativizations result from theoretical 
constraints within contrastivism (see above). If a lack of fit with certain kinds of data results and if 
that is a problem, then all the worse for contrastivism. 
13 Some authors (see Hawthorne 2004, p. 29; Stanley 2005, p. 9) hold that acceptable practical reasoning 
requires knowledge of its premises. Whatever the connection between knowledge and practical 
reasoning should turn out to be, if there is one at all, then contrastivists about knowledge will also 
have to tell a corresponding contrastivist story about practical reasoning (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2004, 
2006). This project, however, is problematic for reasons I cannot go into here (but cf. my 
forthcoming-b for related problems concerning moral reasoning).  
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conjunction do these points “refute” contrastivism. However, they point at limitations of 
the theory and at certain prizes it has to pay if it wants to retain plausibility. 
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Appendix: Contrastive Beliefs? 
 
What about contrastivism about beliefs14? If belief is contrastive, then perhaps knowledge 
derives its contrastive nature from belief?15 The thesis would be that belief, too, is a 
ternary relation between a subject, a proposition believed and a contrast proposition. 
Sentences of the form "S believes that p" would be elliptical for sentences of the form "S 
believes that p rather than q" (where "rather than q" is, of course, not part of the content of 
the belief). Sue might believe that she is seeing a dog rather than that she is seeing a cat but 
she might not believe that she is seeing a dog rather than that she is seeing a wolf. Is this 
unorthodox view about the nature of belief plausible? 
Let us start with the uncontroversial idea that an acceptable account of belief must 
allow for an account of the truth conditions of beliefs. If one thinks of beliefs in the usual 
way – as a dyadic relation between a person and a proposition -, then it is easy to give truth 
conditions for beliefs. It works according to the following schema: 
 
The belief that p is true iff p. 
 
14 Schaffer 2005, sec. 4 seems to assume that belief is contrastive; however, in personal communication 
he has denied this. Swinburne 2001, 34 very shortly remarks that belief is contrastive but does not go 
into details. Much more detailed is Blaauw 2004, ch.6, and recently Morton/ Karjalainen 2008, 278-
279). 
15 I am not assuming the false principle here that if F is L and F is necessary for G, then G is L. If 
knowledge should inherit its contrastive nature from belief, then the inheritance would have to be 
based on something else than the mere fact that belief is necessary for knowledge. 
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There is a principle at work here which is analogous to disquotation principles for 
sentences: Skip “the belief that” on the left side of “is true iff” and you get the right hand 
side of the bi-conditional (assuming that the meta-language contains the object-language). 
How does this work in the case of contrastive belief? One might think of something 
like the following schema: 
 
The belief that p rather than q is true iff p rather than q. 
 
A principle resembling the above “disquotation” principle has been used but now with a 
weird result: We don’t understand what kind of condition that is and what the right-hand 
side of the conditional means. What does it mean to say that “p rather than q”? One way to 
go would be to extend contrastivism to truth. Truth would be contrastive insofar as truth 
conditions (for sentences, beliefs, etc.) are themselves contrastive. I wouldn’t choose this 
option: It is hard if not impossible to make any sense of this idea. Apart from all that 
,"rather than q" is not part of the content of the belief and for that reason one might not 
want to include it in the "disquotation". 
Perhaps we need to modify the disquotation principle for contrastive belief in the 
following way: 
 
The belief that p rather than q is true iff p. 
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But this also leads to several problems: The belief that p rather than q would have the 
same truth conditions as the belief that p rather than r.16 The belief that the book is red 
rather than blue would have the same truth conditions as the belief that the book is red 
rather than yellow. How could these two beliefs have the same truth conditions if they are 
substantially different beliefs? I am not suggesting that truth conditions alone individuate 
beliefs. Rather, I am suggesting that quite different beliefs should not be expected to share 
their truth conditions. 
There is also another problem. It seems possible that S has two beliefs: 
 
The belief that p rather than q 
 
and 
 
The belief that q rather than r, 
 
such that "p" and "q" cannot, of course, both be true.  
 
Here is an example: 
 
Fred believes that Jack stole the bike (p) rather than Jill stole the bike (q), 
 
But it is also the case that 
16 Thanks to RC here. 
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Fred believes that Jill stole the bike (q) rather than Jill stole the car (r). 
 
Let us assume here that only one theft has occurred. What would be the truth conditions of 
these two beliefs according to the modified disquotation principle? The first belief is true 
iff p whereas the second belief is true iff q. So far, so good, one might say. But really, so 
far so bad: p and q cannot both be true because q is a contrast proposition for p. On the 
other hand, the two beliefs do not seem contradictory or mutually inconsistent. But how 
can their truth conditions then be mutually incompatible? 
The overall conclusion is clear: Even if you are a contrastivist about knowledge you 
shouldn't be a contrastivist about belief. 
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